Showing posts with label condominium. Show all posts
Showing posts with label condominium. Show all posts

Thursday, July 17, 2014

Surely you can evict a tenant for prostitution; our Charter of Rights & Freedoms is impacting the landscape of landlord and tenant relations AND Summary Judgment; somethings change but yet might stay the same

One of the more difficult grounds to terminate tenancies for is breach of lease or breach of bylaws by acting in a manner which is criminal.  The reason for this is that the burden of proof in criminal matters is "beyond a reasonable doubt" whereas the civil standard is "on the balance of probabilities".  Notwithstanding this if a condominium corporation or a landlord has evidence of criminal activity related to prostitution by a tenant that an eviction would imminent on application to the Court.


In 1214777 Alberta Ltd v 480955 Alberta Ltd, 2014 ABQB 301 Master Schlosser was asked to terminate a tenancy based on the allegation that the tenant was participating in the criminal activity of prostitution.  He concluded that he could not based on the recent SCC case law which has now confirmed that the rights of prostitutes are protected by our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Master Schlosser concluded:




[44] If we put the conflicts in the evidence aside for a moment, the complicating factor about the landlord’s arguments is that the law of selling sex for money is in a state of limbo. Canadian prostitution laws were challenged in the Supreme Court of Canada and found to be unconstitutional. Madam Justice McLachlin said for the Court in Canada (AG) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC72:

3. Three applicants, all current or former prostitutes, brought an application seeking declarations that three provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, are unconstitutional.
4. The three impugned provisions criminalize various activities related to prostitution. They are primarily concerned with preventing public nuisance, as well as the exploitation of prostitutes. Section 210 makes it an offence to be an inmate of a bawdy-house, to be found in a bawdy-house without lawful excuse, or to be an owner, landlord, lessor, tenant, or occupier of a place who knowingly permits it to be used as a bawdy-house. Section 212(1)(j) makes it an offence to live on the avails of another’s prostitution. Section 213(1)(c) makes it an offence to either stop or attempt to stop, or communicate or attempt to communicate with, someone in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or hiring a prostitute.
5. However, prostitution itself is not illegal. It is not against the law to exchange sex for money. Under the existing regime, Parliament has confined lawful prostitution to two categories: street prostitution and “out-calls” – where the prostitute goes out and meets the client at a designated location, such as the client’s home. This reflects a policy choice on Parliament’s part. Parliament is not precluded from imposing limits on where and how prostitution may be conducted, as long as it does so in a way that does not infringe the constitutional rights of prostitutes.

[45] Although these laws were found to be inconsistent with the Charter and void, the declaration of invalidity was suspended for one year. (The date of the Judgment was December, 2013).
[46] The old laws are still on the books but in a kind of legal limbo. Some of the activities at 50th Street Massage Centre might technically constitute crimes but neither 50th Street Massage Therapy nor its inmates or proprietors have been convicted, or pleaded guilty to any municipal or federal offences, much less offences under the Criminal Code of Canada.
[47] The commercial lease speaks to legality not morality. I am not willing to terminate this commercial lease on the basis of this state of the law and evidence. 



The case was also noteworthy to see how the recent judicial pronouncements with respect to Summary Judgment applications are being applied in Applications to Masters ; Master Schlosser commented:




[14] The Hryniak approach was recently endorsed by our Court of Appeal in Windsor v Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., 2014 ABCA 108. Although that case was a ‘law case’, not ‘a facts case’, and the remarks in that decision are obiter with respect to whether there are any enhanced fact-finding powers now enjoyed by judges in this province, the Court did observe that the approach chosen by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak was consistent with the Alberta rules. Rule 7.3 uses the very wide term, ‘merit’, and Rule 6.11, which lists the types of evidence that can be considered on a motion, includes oral evidence (6.11(g)). Our Court of Appeal has now also endorsed this approach for rule 3.68 applications (O’Connor Associates Environmental Inc. v. MEC OP LLC, 2014 ABCA 140 ).


[15] It remains to be seen whether a judge sitting in chambers in Alberta can now find facts or determine credibility based on Affidavit evidence. As was noted in the Ontario Civil Justice Reform Project, there are many layers of decisions against it (and see Beier v. Proper Cat Construction Ltd., 2013 ABQB 351,at para. 68, O’Hanlon Paving Ltd. v. Serengetti Develoments Ltd., 2013 ABQB 428 and Schaffer v. Lalonde, 2014 ABQB 222 (M)). Like the case in Ontario, a rule change, or a legislative change might be necessary.


[16] If we put these decisions together, the approach that now ought to be taken toward summary determination is as follows. I am drawing remarks of Master MacLeod in the Pammett decision and those of Wakeling, J., (as he then was) in the Proper Cat case. The new approach has been described as the “roadmap approach”. As I see it, the Alberta roadmap is as follows:


[17] The starting point (as found in the Windsor decision para. 13 and Hryniak at para. 49) is ‘to examine the record to see if a disposition that is fair and just to both parties can be made on the existing record’. The court is to look at the record and the dispute to decide whether it is essential to the resolution of the dispute that the court see the witnesses. If the answer is yes, the matter must go to trial. If the initial answer is ‘no’, the court is to engage in a six step process:
  1. The court is to presume that the best evidence from both sides is before the court. (e.g. Canada v. Lameman, 2008 1 SCR 372, at 378 and 382). The decided cases tell us that summary judgment applications have to be decided on the evidence before the court and not on what the evidence might be. Parties are required to put their best foot forward. This
    reinforces the importance of treating summary judgment applications advisedly and with due caution. The only caveat that might apply here is that if the summary judgment application is before a Master and the losing party does not like the Master’s opinion, it is not so difficult to patch up the evidence on appeal.
  2. As a corollary to number 1, the court is to ask whether a negative inference can be drawn from the absence of evidence on certain points.
  3. Next, the court should look at the complete package and ask whether all of the evidence is admissible. Rule 13.18 (3), for example, tells us that we can’t use hearsay for a final application.
  4. Next, the court should ask whether there is a conflict in the evidence and, if so, whether, (a) the conflict has been resolved on cross examination: Janvier v 834474 Alberta Ltd., 2010 ABQB 800, or, (b), whether the evidence giving rise to the conflict is purely self-serving and is otherwise unsupported: Guaranty v. Gordon, 1999 SCC. Self serving evidence does not give rise to a triable issue.
  5. The next step is to examine the evidence. As Master MacLeod said in the Pammett decision:

    [28] There are subtle distinctions here. The court may assess the sufficiency of the evidence admissibility of evidence and reliability of evidence without access to enhanced fact finding powers. The court may also apply the law to the facts without deciding a genuine question of law.

    (emphasis added).   Assessing the sufficiency of the evidence will also involve considering whether the issue can fairly be decided on the factual record before the court (Tottrup v. Clearwater Municipal District (99) (2007) 68 Alta L.R. (4th) 237 at 242 and Gayton v. Lacasse, 2010 ABCA 123 at para. 11).
  6. Having performed that evidentiary exercise, as Master MacLeod further says in the Pammett case: (and see Proper Cat at paras. 61-64, 69):

     [31] A plaintiff will be entitled to judgment if the plaintiff can prove all elements of the cause of action and the defendant either has no defence or is missing critical elements of proof necessary to maintain that defence. A defendant will be entitled to judgment if the plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of its cause or if the defendant has a complete defence.





[18] In a sense, much of the above is not truly new. It is more like a field guide to the principles summarized in Proper Cat and elsewhere. The main change is that the concept of proportionality urges the court to give summary remedies where it can.


[19] None of this affects the well established legal burdens. The legal or persuasive burden is on the Applicant throughout. The Respondent is not obliged to furnish evidence. However, if an Applicant discharges the evidentiary burden imposed upon it on a balance of probabilities, the evidentiary burden then falls to the Respondent to show that there is arguable merit to the case: Murphy Oil Company Ltd. v. Predator Corporation Ltd., 2006 ABCA 69, Proper Cat at paras. 66-7, 70, and Dasilva v McLean, 2011 ABQB 618 (M), and, now, that there is a compelling reason that it should go to trial.


[20] As noted in Schaffer v. Lalonde, Masters have an additional power under section 9(3)(b) of the Court of Queen’s Bench Act. If the evidence leads to something that cannot be resolved on the basis set out above, the parties can agree to have the court determine the issue, which would be fully in keeping with the concept of proportionality and would be consistent with embracing the culture shift noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak.


[21] There is one last issue. And it requires guidance from above. The Hryniak case suggests that the threshold for granting summary judgment may be at the civil standard (balance of probability), rather than ‘plain and obvious’, or ‘beyond doubt’, which is closer to the criminal standard. The Supreme Court of Canada did not directly address this issue, or for that matter, any of the cases that establish the standard. It was not necessary to the decision as a chambers judge found that the outcome ‘was clear’, which seems to imply that the higher standard was met.


[22] Nevertheless, there is a tension between the language used in the Hryniak case and the well established standard for granting summary remedies. Until this issue is dealt with, when the court asks whether there is ‘any issue of merit that genuinely requires a trial’ (Windsor at para. 16), or whether a fair and just determination can be made on the merits, the threshold remains ‘plain and obvious’, ‘or beyond doubt’. In the meantime, this court is not free to conduct ‘paper trials’ on the civil standard.


[23] The concept of proportionality does not mean, as some hopeful plaintiff’s seem to think, that plaintiff’s now have a license to railroad the defendant. The concept cuts both ways. 







I have taken the comments from Master Schlosser to reflect that though much has changed not much has changed.  This was also reflected to me on a recent Special Application to Master Robertson.  The Court will continue to expect a high standard of proof to conclude that Summary Judgment should be granted but the Hryniak and Windsor cases will work to extol Masters and Justices to take one last look at the evidence to see if an equitable result can be achieved without the burden of trial.

Friday, February 7, 2014

Purchaser's Liens - A Summary


In a recent case out of the Supreme Court of BC, Pan Canadian Mortgage Group Inc. v. 679972 B.C. Ltd.,2013 BCSC 1078, the Honourable Madam Justice M. Koenigsberg provided an excellent summary of the nature of a Purchaser's Lien in dismissing the assertion of Judgment Creditors that they had priority.  The following text from pages 19 to 22; I have highlighted what I consider a few salient points:

 "What are the Essential Features or Requirements for a Purchaser’s Lien?

[90] A purchaser’s lien is a well-established equitable charge over property that arises at the time a purchaser of property provides a deposit or funds to the vendor or their agent in part or whole payment of the purchase price. A purchaser’s lien is created by equity not by contract. The law establishing a purchaser’s lien has a long history stretching from at least the mid-1800’s to today. A case similar to the one at bar is Whitbread & Co., Limited v. Watt, [1902] 1 Ch. 835 at 838. In this case the purchaser was purchasing a freehold public-house plot on a building estate. The purchase was to complete as soon as 300 houses had been built on the estate. The 300 houses were not built. The purchaser sued for a return of their monies based upon a purchaser’s lien. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams stated at 838:
...
The lien which a purchaser has for his deposit is not the result of any express contract; it is a right which may be said to have been invented for the purpose of doing justice. ...

[91] One of the first cases to discuss purchaser's liens is the oft cited case of Rose v. Watson, [1864] 10 H.L.C. 672. The House of Lords found that when a portion of the purchase price for property was paid the payor obtained a security interest, similar to that of a mortgagee, equivalent to the funds paid. Lord Westbury stated at 682:
...
.... It was money advanced upon the faith that the land, the subject of the contract, would become the property of the Respondent; and being so paid as part of the purchase-money under the contract, and being paid in advance, on the faith of the vendor’s performance of the contract, I think that your Lordships will have little difficulty in coming to the conclusion that those sums of money thus paid formed principal sums, in respect of which there became a lien from the time of the payment of them; ... [Emphasis added]

[92] As stated by Di Castri in the Law of Vendor and Purchaser, 3rd edition, Volume 3 at para. 913, p. 18-20:
...
... The lien is decreed independently of the contract, which does not give it, but furnishes the reason for the decree. ...

[93] At the time any payment on account of the purchase price is made, a purchaser obtains an equitable right to security in the land to the extent of their payments. This right is immediately vested to secure repayment of the purchase monies so paid in the event the contract is not completed through no fault of the purchaser. (Whitbread; Rose; Capital Plaza Developments Ltd. v. Counterpoint Enterprises Ltd., [1985] B.C.J. No. 321 (S.C.) at paras. 9-11).

[94] Put another way, the courts have found that the payment on account of the purchase price (whether as a deposit or otherwise) is not just a partial payment but is security for the completion of the purchase. If the purchaser fails to perform their part of the contract, the vendor has security against the funds; if the vendor fails to perform, the purchaser can recover the funds and is entitled to a lien on the subject matter of the contract. By virtue of the lien the purchaser is a secured creditor. (Levy v. Stogdon, [1898] 1 Ch. 478 (C.A.) at 486; J.A.R. Leaseholds Ltd. v. Tormet Ltd. and Kaye (1965), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 97 (Ont. C.A.))

[95] Di Castri has described the nature of a purchaser's lien at (Law of Vendor and Purchaser, 3rd edition, Volume 3, at para. 913, pp. 18-20):
...
Where a contract goes off without any misconduct or default on the part of the purchaser, he acquires an equitable lien, on the subject land, in general commensurate with the purchase money paid. To put this another way, in order to do justice between a vendor and a purchaser under a contract for the sale of land, equity gives the latter a lien on the estate by way of an equitable charge in respect of all payments made on account of the price, interest, and costs.
While there is no doubt that an action to enforce a purchaser’s lien is based on an affirmance of the contract, there appears to be some technical legal question as to the affirmative right of a purchaser to claim his lien, where he has rescinded the contract. It is submitted, however, that whether the transaction falls through by reason of the inability of the vendor to convey as agreed or whether the contract is rescinded before completion by reason of the vendor’s misrepresentation of a material fact, in either event, the purchaser’s right to a lien cannot be affected. The objection is urged that, assuming the right of a purchaser to a lien, it is abandoned where the contract is rescinded. The argument is that
...
In order to ascertain the real nature of the exercise of equitable power, it may be considered in relation to its basis and to the result of its operation. The basis is the promise of the vendor to convey the land, as and when agreed, and that meanwhile he is a trustee of the legal title for the purchaser to the extent of the purchase moneys paid. The extent of its operation is to subject the land to the execution of a trust, either to convey, where there has been full performance by the purchaser or to return him his moneys, where the contract has failed and ceases to be binding through no fault of the latter. It supplies a remedy where the law falls short of accomplishing full justice. If equity lays hold of a pretext, or adopts a fiction, in such a case it is not more than it does in many other cases, in order to enforce a natural right and to affect a just result.
...

[96] The enforcement of a purchaser’s lien can be sought when there is no ability to enforce specific performance or where the purchaser does not want specific performance. If specific performance is available to a purchaser title can be transferred or the purchaser can elect to claim under the purchaser's lien. In the circumstances where specific performance is not possible, the purchaser’s equitable interest in the land remains which is enforceable through the lien. (Rose; Levy; Cornwall v. Henson, [1899] 2 Ch. 710 at 714; Law of Vendor and Purchaser,
3rd edition, Volume 3, at para. 919, pp.18-26; J.A.R. Leaseholds Ltd. at para. 28).

[97] The court found that upon paying the monies the purchaser obtained a purchaser’s lien over the property as a whole (Whitbread). The principle that the lien will apply to the property as a whole rather than to the particular portion of the property for which the funds were advanced was reiterated in the British Columbia case of Lehmann v. B.R.M. Enterprises Ltd. (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 87 (B.C.S.C.). In this case the plaintiff was the purchaser of a strata unit in a planned strata development. He had paid the entire purchase price for the unit to the vendor. The vendor went bankrupt and did not complete the development and did not file a strata plan. The court found that the right to the purchaser’s lien was not affected by the fact that the strata plan had not been registered. The right to the lien was not dependent upon the ability of the vendor to convey title and the purchaser was entitled to a lien over the entire development property for the amount paid notwithstanding that the lands that were the subject of the contract did not exist and specific performance could not be ordered."

Justice Koenigsberg applied this equitable principal to find in favour of the parties who registered purchaser’s liens.  It is a powerful remedy which arises in any circumstance when a purchaser pays money on a condominium project which is not completed. Developer’s often try to control this dynamic by providing in the purchase and sale agreement that a purchaser may not register a Caveat/Lien to protect money which has been paid to the Developer prior to the development occurring.  This failure to register can be fatal and it is suggested that purchasers should not agree to such limitation.


The purchaser’s lien also arises under what is referred to as an Agreement for Sale (this is distinct from an Agreement to Sell).  In this circumstance a purchaser provides money against the purchase price and continues to make payments until the full purchaser price is paid.  The title to the property subject of the sale remains in the name of the vendor and the vendor is not obliged to transfer the property to the purchaser until all payments are made.  In Alberta our Law of Property Act imposes upon vendors the obligation to commence a foreclosure in the even that a purchaser breaches an Agreement for Sale.  This statutory requirement prohibits vendors from being unjustly enriched.  The property subject of the sale will as part of the foreclosure be required to be sold and the monies paid by the purchaser are contemplated by the Court in establishing the redemption period which proceeds the Court ordered sale.  The money paid by the purchaser forms an equitable interest in the subject property and is only forfeited to the vendor and the Agreement for Sale extinguished upon completion of the foreclosure action.